WhirledView had an interesting post by Patricia Lee Sharpe yesterday entitled “How to Regain the Public Diplomacy Initiative.” Sharpe is an astute observer, and her post last week on Sri Lanka was the best I’ve seen on a subject that deserves far more attention than it’s receiving. Unfortunately, I found Sunday’s post somewhat lacking.
Sharpe frames her piece as a lament of the death of public diplomacy. She then moves to her true lament, the death of the USIA (the home of US public diplomacy efforts until it became part of State in 1999). Unfortunately, rather than contributing something new, Sharpe added her post to the old argument that reinstituting the USIA will do something more than create a new bureaucracy.
Sharpe blames our current woes on the diffusion of public diplomacy among various departments and agencies. She then suggests that putting all of it back into a new USIA would restore order to the system. Sharpe fails to recognize that all foreign policy, not just public diplomacy is increasingly diffused among State, the military, the intelligence agencies, and a variety of other official actors.
Had USIA survived 1999, I believe it would be just as starved for resources as State. I also believe DOD would still be pushing in on PD efforts and “diffusing” our message, except State would also want an independent voice, making things worse.
Our current problem is policy, not the location of our PD efforts. Let’s look at some numbers. In February of 1982, about 60% of Western Europeans said they had a very high or somewhat favorable view of the U.S. By 1994, that had increased to 67%. In 2002, it was also about 67%. Then, in May 2003, the number plummeted to 55%. In 1982 Europe was upset about Reagan’s policies and in 2003 it was very upset about the Iraq War. In the easy, breezy ‘90’s, Europe liked us just as much when State was in charge in 2002 as when the USIA was in charge in 1994. U.S. policies have much more to do with our current situation than the lack of an independent USIA.
USIA folded into State so that PD specialists would have a stronger voice at the policy table, to bring them in at the take-off instead of the crash landing. Unfortunately, during the years since 9/11, State’s policy voice has been marginalized, and along with it, the voice of public diplomacy. I respect Sharpe and agree with much of what she’s saying (PD does need more resources and attention), but her arguments all hold true with PD where it is (we can pour money and authority into State just as well as into a new USIA). I’m all for a new beginning in public diplomacy and foreign policy, but Sharpe presents a stale argument from a battle lost ten years ago.
