The Public Demarche

March 30, 2009

Last week President Obama reached out to the Iranians in a largely publicized video.  He said,

“…in this season of new beginnings I would like to speak clearly to Iran’s leaders. We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect… The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right - but it comes with real responsibilities…” 

Two days later, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei replied,

“If you go on with the slogan of discussion and pressure, saying that you will negotiate with Iran, and at the same time impose pressure, threats, and changes, then our nation will not like such words. We do not have any experience with the new US President and Government. We shall see and judge. You change, and we shall change as well… If you go on with the slogan of discussion and pressure, saying that you will negotiate with Iran, and at the same time impose pressure, threats, and changes, then our nation will not like such words… We shall see and judge. You change, and we shall change as well.”

My Initial Thoughts

Initially, I was annoyed.  We look like a bunch of putzes, being dictated terms by a tin pot dictatorship, how could we open ourselves up like that?  Giving Iran another opportunity to shoot us the bird didn’t seem like a solid strategy.

A Rational Examination

After getting over my hurt pride, I thought about it a bit more.  Let’s look at the decision rationally, before it was made.  The Iranians had two main courses of action, they could either respond favorably or unfavorably, let’s look at the results for either:

  1. Favorable - In the unlikely event that the Iranians had reacted favorably, Obama would have gained the kind of early victory that he’s been searching for. 
  2. Unfavorable - The more likely (and chosen) reaction was for the Iranians to spurn the offer.  It becomes much more difficult to characterize the U.S. as the unreasonable party.  Moderates have a bit more ammunition in the upcoming Iranian elections.  Besides, as Robert Kagan pointed out, “What is the risk? It’s not as if the Bush administration was doing anything to help the people of Iran rid themselves of their leaders. And it’s not as if the Bush administration’s approach had slowed Tehran down…”

Who was Obama Talking To?

Since 9/11, our message has been directed to our enemies, and that message has been, “Be afraid.”  We took it for granted that our allies would understand that this message was directed only at those who would do us harm.  Unfortunately, many around the world who were ambivalent toward American hegemony took the message personally.  Obama, in sending this video to Iran, is actually talking to the masses around the world who aren’t involved in the war on terror (or whatever it’s called these days), but who are affected by America, the world system, or by local governments that have to work with us.  Obama’s message is that we’re trying to talk to these people, but they don’t really want to talk.  (Admittedly, there was assuredly a domestic audience as well, but that’s beyond the scope of this blog.)

Final Thoughts

The choice then was a win-win for Obama.  No matter the Iranian’s choice, Obama got something, in exchange for a three minute video.  Many have criticized the move as not offering enough sticks or carrots, a point that is both true and irrelevant.  (They’re still worth reading though, for an excellent example, see Charles Coutinho’s analysis.)  The message is that the U.S. is trying to be reasonable.  We Americans take that for granted, but the rest of the world has been aching for a reminder.

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