There is a long-running phrase in U.S. government, “politics stop at the water’s edge.” Generally, it has been considered best that foreign policy be made by the small group of foreign policy elite, a relative handful of think tanks, academics, politicians, and bureaucrats. Sometimes, however, a politician, a diaspora group, or some other interested party tries to drum up public opinion for some course of action. Generally, the party in power will decide on an action, and the other party naturally takes the opposing view. This was perfectly illustrated during the first Bush-Kerry debate in 2004:
LEHRER: I want to make sure — yes, sir — but in this one minute, I want to make sure that we understand — the people watching understand the differences between the two of you on this.
You want to continue the multinational talks, correct?
BUSH: Right.
LEHRER: And you’re willing to do it…
KERRY: Both…
LEHRER: And you’re opposed to that. Right?
BUSH: The minute we have bilateral talks, the six-party talks will unwind…
Secondly, he said — my opponent said where he worked to put sanctions on Iran — we’ve already sanctioned Iran. We can’t sanction them any more. There are sanctions in place on Iran…
KERRY: Well, I’ll tell you exactly why not, but I first want to say something about those sanctions on Iran.
Only the United States put the sanctions on alone, and that’s exactly what I’m talking about.
In order for the sanctions to be effective, we should have been working with the British, French and Germans and other countries. And that’s the difference between the president and me.
That’s right, first the opposition candidate (Kerry) criticized the incumbent (Bush) for being too multilateral on Korea before criticizing him for being too unilateral on Iran. [Begin CYA: Kerry voters don’t get me wrong, I’m not blaming Kerry (and I recognize that there are other reasons beside simple opposition, but I’d wager opposition was the greatest reason), if anything Bush politicized the foreign policy aspects of that election for war-time presidential continuity (and I’m not attacking Bush, F.D.R. did the same thing). End CYA.] The point is that politicization warps foreign policy, let’s look at another example.
AIPAC
Perhaps the best known offenders are AIPAC (The American/Israel Public Affairs Committee, the guys who lobby for Israel to congress and the President). The Bush administration was frequently criticized for being too soft on Israel, and AIPAC was frequently listed as the cause. Of course, the more the right supported Israel’s controversial actions, the more the left fought back (despite, or perhaps because of, its relative impotence during the first six years). While supporting Hamas is still complete political suicide, only 31 percent of Israelis consider Obama pro-Israel. This hasn’t always been the case; during a difficult period in the first Bush administration, then Secretary of State James Baker once remarked, “F**k the Jews, they don’t even vote for us.”
So, we’ve looked at Iran, North Korea, and Israel. Let’s look at a less clear example.
Venezuela
Hugo Chavez has been trying desperately to politicize his rage against the machine. Many on the right were happy to take the bait, demonizing Chavez and talking ad nauseum about his relations with Iran and Russia. Bush, however, never took the bait. His administration’s line was basically to ignore Chavez all together, to deny him the legitimacy that one-on-one debate with the hegemon bestows. While much has been made of Obama’s handshake, he laughed it off, saying, “I think it’s just that President Chavez is better at positioning the cameras.” Playing down Chavez all together could easily be seen as a continuation of Bush’s Venezuela talking points (albeit with a much less belligerent Chavez). On the other hand, the minute it happened, Republicans back home began vocally criticizing Obama for cavorting with the leader of Venezuela. So, who knows what the future holds.
This is the part where I completely undermine my entire point. (It’s a Foreign Service tradition.) I admit I could argue both sides of this case to an extent. I didn’t mention the obvious example of the war in Iraq, because war both demands and requires a public debate that tends to foment politicization. Also, one could mention Cuba as a counter example—their politicization has ensured the continuity of an embargo on an impoverished island for nearly fifty years.
Your opinions?
What do you think? Have I missed the boat? Should politics dictate our policies with respect to Kyrgyzstan, Togo, and every other country in the world? Have I overstated the risks to stakeholders in politicization as a strategy? Are there other good examples? What do they teach us? I love your feedback!
{ 1 comment… read it below or add one }
The politicization of international relations ensures that American foreign policy remains dynamic. While it is sorrowing to see issues of importance consumed by partisan talking points, such effectively staves off the widespread adoption of uncritical assumption in place of analysis and reason. Very little else outside of outright politicalization does this job so well.
If given the choice between a political class that leaves politics at the water’s edge by adopting stagnate groupthink and a political class painfully divided by incisive debate, I would choose the latter option. It is much easier to adapt to new problems and conditions when electoral politics allows for more than one solution to be brought to the table, methinks.