I’m sure you’ve all seen the reports about the 20th anniversary of the massacre at Tiananmen Square. On June 4, 1989, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army cleared out a group of student protesters that had gathered in said square since April. Those events in 1989 are seen by many as the pinnacle of the Chinese human rights movement—human rights reformers had never before and (so far) have never since come so close to winning political freedom.
FPRI published an interesting retrospective, looking at American human rights diplomacy with China since the events. The author, Amy Gadsden, points out that the main currency since the events have been prisoner releases. Before any international event, the U.S. requests that some political prisoner, usually a human rights activist of some sort, be released. Traditionally, China will comply, but will do nothing more to reform.
China’s Human Rights Grievances
Last February, Human Rights Watch released a letter advising that the Secretary bring up several specific human rights points. I’ll list them here for those who don’t know, for those that do, please feel free to skip to the next subtitle…
- Tibet and Xinjiang (i.e. Uyghurstan)
- Torture
- Press Censorship
- Abusing Human Rights Activists
- Extrajudicial Detention
Does the new administration care?
Ok, maybe that was overly alarmist, but we all remember Secretary Clinton’s remarks during her first visit to China,
“Successive administrations and Chinese governments have been poised back and forth on these issues, and we have to continue to press them. But our pressing on those issues can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis…”
Gadsden also points out that prior to the Beijing Olympics, no prisoners were asked for, and none were released.
Can the U.S. effect change with civil society?
I’ve written before about U.S. human rights efforts. Gadsden points out that throughout much of our history of pushing for human rights in China, U.S. diplomats and officials have sat across from stone-faced communist bureaucrats. These men (and I understand they are nearly all men) have no incentive to change, and no patience to listen to a bunch of foreigners. She suggests the U.S. begin to work with China’s burgeoning civil society. She says,
“China has a small but capable NGO movement focused on a range of local, national, and even international concerns, from public health to environmental awareness to discrimination against migrants and minorities. The rights consciousness movement has energized lawyers and citizens to take up sensitive legal cases and push the legal system to abide by Chinese law and international norms. Every day, bloggers and netizens use the Internet to expose corruption and highlight rights violations. And even in the area of political reform, there are brave Chinese citizens who are vying to get nominated as independent candidates for local people’s congresses. American policy toward China has not ignored these developments, but it has not made a priority of them either.”
We haven’t made a priority of them. It’s unfortunate, but I haven’t seen a lot of U.S. embassy interaction with civil society. Maybe it’s just the areas in which I’ve served, or that fact that I’ve never worked in a public affairs section, but I think that’s something of a weakness in our foreign policy efforts. We’ve been trying to change that for sometime, and this may be another reason to prioritize that change.
Can the U.S. effect change through classical diplomacy?
I’ve also written about this administration’s China policy, even pointing out that, “what sticks and carrots we have remain to be seen.” China’s line has always been that it considers human rights part of its domestic affairs, and that it does not tolerate foreign interference in sovereignty. Last week, however, Matt Stone pointed out that China has a growing stake in U.S. domestic affairs, growing increasingly concerned that our inflation will damage Chinese currency reserves. So who knows, maybe in a few years we’ll have a carrot.
Your thoughts?
I always love to ask what you think, dear reader. Are either of these two approaches likely to have any effect whatsoever on Chinese human rights? Are there other options that could be further explored? Should the U.S. even care?
{ 7 comments… read them below or add one }
Very interesting post!
I can see a healthy civil society being essential for democratizing nations, but wouldn’t it be completely ineffectual in authoritarian systems? I’m guessing the approach is based on the assumption that leaders are responsive to citizen interests. That’s great when domestic institutions are in place to enforce that… but in China? My sense is that fostering civil society only has an impact where broad swaths of the population are politically salient. I’m not clear on how citizen voices actually matter in China.
@Martini - You make a good point, but I do think we should be doing something, and clearly what we’ve been doing for the past thirty years hasn’t been working. While Chinese civil society hasn’t been successful in installing democracy, they do seem to have some success in things like combating corruption. I’m not sure this is the answer either, but agree that we need a new direction.
My thinking is that a lot seems to be riding on how these issues are framed vis-a-vis the Chinese. It seems that the entire discussion has been framed in terms of Western concepts of political right and sovereignty - the dignity of the individual, the government as responding to the will of the people, etc.
Chinese IR theory seems to be based on a completely different logic - Sinocentrism, the value of elite politics, and the primacy of national interest over ethical concerns. I think you can really see this in China’s claims to the South China Sea, but I’d guess it might also be at work in its attitude towards attempts to influence its human rights policies.
All this is simply to say I can understand how these messages imploring China to respect human dignity can fall on deaf ears. I think the interesting challenge, then, would be to think about how human rights issues can be framed in Chinese world order. Let me go and dust off my Confucius.
I wonder if economic engagement isn’t the best path to civil rights for the Chinese. In countries like Taiwan and South Korea economic development and the emergence of a middle class fostered relatively smooth transitions from dictatorship to democracy. If China does well enough economically, it may well find that it’s own people demand the change we are looking for.
I’m not saying that the US should give up highlighting Chinese civil rights abuses, but in the end a strong Chinese middle class may do more than all the lecturing and posturing. In this North Korea and Cuba look to be good examples of ‘too much stick’. In both instances the attempt to make them pariahs has merely entrenched the existing power structures while leaving the people bereft of not only civil rights, but also a decent standard of living.
I believe china can have a fair and equal country.
But they need better leadership.
Hong Kong , Singapore and Taiwan have succeeded now its china’s turn.
This was a really interesting post. I dont know a whole lot about how this sort of diplomacy works, but my understanding is that a major part Emassy’s work, especially in countries like China (massive trade volume, major purchaser of USG bonds), is to protect American business interests. Anything accomplished in the field of human rights is great, but first and foremost, the embassy’s job is to preserve and protect American firms’ ability to smoothly do business in China. I am not stating my personal belief, but my understanding of the embassy’s assigned role–so please correct me if I’m wrong.
That being said, isn’t it conceivable that increased US embassy involvement in China’s civil society would incur the wrath of the same stone-faced diplomats who won’t listen to direct US appeal for greater human rights? The chinese NGOs challenging the domestic status quo are a thorn in the side of the regime. I doubt if the PRC would look favorably upon any US attempt to empower them. And to reciprocate, they could find a myriad of ways to make life extremely difficult for American businesses. Is it possible that the lack of embassy involvement in Chinese civil society isn’t a result of oversight but rather a calculated decision that in terms of American interests, the risks outweigh the benefits?